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Abstract 
Various theories suggest conscious phenomena are based exclusively on brain activity, 
while others regard them as a result of the interaction between embodied agents and their 
environment. In this paper, I will consider whether this divergence entails the acceptance 
of the fact that different theories can be applied in different scales (as in the case of phys-
ics), or if they are reconcilable. I will suggest that investigating how the term representa-
tion is used can reveal some hints, building upon which we can bridge the gulf between 
the two poles in the long run. In my argumentation I will rely on some earlier philosophical 
insights, such as those of Descartes, James, Wittgenstein and Merleau-Ponty, as well as 
research based on global workspace theory, and the conceptions of embodied and enacted 
cognition. I will suggest that within a wider horizon of investigation, the ambiguity as 
regards the term representation will decrease. 









The phrase ‘in the mind’ has caused more confusion than almost any other in philosophy.  
(Wittgenstein, 1979, p. 114) 
 
Introduction 
Mind, cognition, consciousness, and self have been regarded as closely related, both his-
torically and functionally.1 However, their relationship is far from unambiguous. I will 
examine criticisms that call attention to misinterpretations of certain scientific results 
(Ai ⁠zawa, 2010; Zahavi, 2008). These criticisms underscore the differences between cer-
tain perspectives and presuppositions. I will suggest that these presuppositions and per-
spectives may conceal, unnoticed, differences in the usage of some key terms, hence 
widening the gap between different approaches.  
The term consciousness has numerous meanings,2 which presupposes various approaches. 
In certain aspects these approaches overlap and at the same time are divergent in some 
details. For example, despite the fact that phenomenology embraces and even relies on 
scientific evidence and, significantly, gives space to representationalism, it regards con-
sciousness and the self in a radically different light than cognitive science. Similarly, pro-
ponents of embodiment and enaction embrace scientific results, but because of their 
commitment to embodiment (which is to some extent common with phenomenology) and 
in some cases explicit preference for an anti-representationalist setting, their comprehen-
sion of certain key concepts differs fundamentally with that of cognitive science. 
If we give credit to the evidence which Gallagher (2005) and Jacob & Jeannerod (2003) 
refer to when emphasizing the importance of the body, bodily skills, and activity, it may 
seem strange to query the role the body plays in our cognitive life. Also, considering the 
distinction between the minimal and the narrative self (Gallagher, 2000) in light of Rama-
chandran’s (2004) effort to give a neural, brain-based account of linguistic and conceptual 
skills, it seems peculiar to regard the narrative self as mere abstraction (Dennett, 1991) 
since the capabilities which Ramachandran establishes on neural settings are hardly imag-
inable without interaction with others, i.e., without the extension of neural activity to bod-
ily skills, which are public.  
In this paper I will suggest that if we take a closer glance at the term representation, we 
will see considerable differences between various fields and authors regarding what we 
should have in mind when using this term. Accordingly, if we can illuminate the diverse 
meanings of representation, we may have a chance to bridge the gap between the theories 
that argue for the primordial role of the brain regarding consciousness and those which 
suggest that the body and the encompassing environment also play an important role when 
consciousness enters the scene. That is, I will suggest that going beyond cranial processes 
                                                          
1 Consider the long history of the evolution of the term “consciousness” from Cudworth, via Locke, to phenom-
enology and more recently, research in psychology, cognitive neurology, and philosophy. 
2 Keeping in mind the difficulty of polymorphism and, from our present perspective more importantly, the dif-
ference in scope when scientific and philosophical theories are in question. 
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is not calling the role of neuronal activity in conscious processes into question, but rather 
it opens up the possibility of reconsidering causal and representational relations. We can 
reconcile the represenationalism of cognitive science with approaches that endorse em-
bodiment; thus it will be apparent that an extension of the cognitive system is not only 
necessary since representationalist accounts of neuronal and cognitive functions take into 
account the interaction with the body—at least on the neuronal level—but also because 
some obstacles are rooted in the ambiguous use of the term representation. 
In the first section of the present paper, as a preliminary, I will consider a number of meth-
odological difficulties including some meta-philosophical considerations. In the subsequent 
section I will attempt to give a rough outline of how consciousness emerges in scientific 
literature as focused on intracranial coherencies. In the third section I will outline some ideas 
that suggest widening the scope of investigation, extending it into bodily and environmental 
aspects of intelligent behaviour in accordance with a holistic and non-dualist approach. In 
the section after that, I will focus on the divergent ways representation is used in the litera-
ture and the questions that are concealed due to this confusion. In conclusion, I will attempt 
to briefly reconcile the neuronal-based and the rather holistic approaches to consciousness. 
 
Aims, Methods, Perspectives 
We must keep in mind the obstacles when attempting to take into consideration different 
kinds of approaches: some are considered as being so-called hard science (such as physics, 
and later, with the discovery of DNA, biology, and recently structural brain imaging), some 
as being soft science (we can have psychology in mind; Frith, 2007), and some as philosoph-
ical, since they are mostly regarded as being speculative. Nonetheless, it is an important 
enterprise. Despite this unfortunate constellation of diverging approaches, various applied 
methods, and convictions regarding measurements’ objectivity vs. subjectivity, philosophy 
can hardly avoid taking into consideration what hard and soft sciences suggest, particularly 
in the case of cognitive capabilities and consciousness studies (Wat⁠son, 1995, p. 101). 
Undoubtedly we need results produced by the sciences, but at the same time we have to be 
cautious of how we interpret them and investigate whether the scope of the evidence is not 
overestimated. When attempting to clarify the relation between the self and self-awareness, 
Dan Zahavi illuminated the dangers of thought experiments and, more importantly from our 
perspective, the difficulties we face when we try to interpret pathological cases. On the one 
hand, the interpretation of different pathological phenomena “usually depends on the frame-
work within which one is operating,” and on the other hand, “it is by no means clear what 
type of conclusion one should draw from” these cases (2008, p. 142). It is not clear whether 
pathological occurrences can be considered signs of anomaly within the theory, or mere ex-
ceptions. Do they reveal some hidden functions as regards normal behaviour, or show a 
compensatory mechanism entailed by a dysfunction? While we can in a more general man-
ner say that “empirical data are important,” their interpretation is up to the framework within 
which they are interpreted, hence “the theoretical impact of an empirical case is not neces-
sarily something that can be easily determined” (Gallagher & Zahavi, 2008, p. 221). 
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Kenneth Aizawa recalls an experiment with Sur’s rewired ferrets and reveals that it does 
not provide evidence for the idea propagated by some theorists such as Alva Noë, who 
suggests “that scientists should search for a broader biological correlate of consciousness” 
instead of focusing on intracranial neuronal processes (Aizawa, 2010b, p. 263). 
The principal point to take away from this research is that Sur and his colleagues performed 
certain surgical interventions on newborn ferrets, then raised these ferrets to adulthood in the 
anticipation that these neonatal interventions will lead to differences in adult area A1. These 
anticipations have been borne out with Sur and his colleagues documenting the various ways 
in which rewired ferret A1 comes to resemble normal ferret V1. What these experiments sug-
gest, contrary to Noë’s view, is that when we look at the intrinsic features of the brain for a 
mechanistic explanation of the visual character of experience, we are probably looking in the 
right place. (Aizawa, 2010b, p. 271) 
The experiment by Sur and his colleagues provides evidence for the plasticity of neuronal 
setting, but says nothing about the extension of the focus of investigation. Although it 
provides evidence supporting theories which propose that surgical intervention changes 
neuronal activity in different brain areas as regards different sense modalities, it does not 
do so for the claim that the brain is exclusively the right place for an explanation of, e.g., 
the visual character of an experience. 
Beyond the difficulties of correct interpretation and abandoning too-demanding conclu-
sions, we face arduousness posed by philosophers. Watson referred to the linguistic turn, 
and thanks to this we are prepared at least to notice some of the grammatical or logical 
and categorical mistakes. But if we go back a bit further to the late 19th and early 20th 
century, we can find unnoticed indications of confusion in philosophy. As I have previ-
ously mentioned (Kondor, 2015), Bergson emphasized the peculiar character of our con-
cepts, while James indicated that we are inclined to duplicate different phenomena when 
we forget that the “thought-of-an-object, and the object-thought-of” are the same. 
 
Consciousness: Neuronal-Based vs. Embodied and Enacted  
At the turn of the 20th century, consciousness was considered as a crucial element in un-
derstanding psychic or mental phenomena. With his insights regarding memory, attention, 
consciousness, etc., William James is regarded by many researchers to be one of the 
“founding father[s] of modern psychology” (Dehaene, 2014, p. 12; Baars, 1988, p. 13). 
His idea of an “empirical parallelism” between “the succession of states of consciousness 
with the succession of total brain-processes” (James, 1932, p. 182) is appreciated even 
today. However, as we will see, some of his convictions provide grounds for criticism as 
well (Baars, 2011, p. 13f.). 
During the 20th century there was considerable, though diverging, progress in cognitive 
studies and research into the mental life. After decades of the dominance of behaviourism 
in psychology, consciousness again entered the focus of interest thanks to technical devel-
opments. Thanks to brain imaging technologies, psychology, whose earlier methods were 
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considered subjective because of a lack of repeatable measuring, was provided with in-
struments which offered a link between subjective reporting and measurable brain activity 
(Frith, 2007, p. 12). However, this link seems to be a faulty one since it can only yield data 
about correlation, but is not capable of affording evidence for causation or constitution. 
This would require other, invasive experimental techniques, such as local stimulation of 
brain areas and/or neurons (Dehaene, 2014, p. 180ff.). 
In the first half of the 20th century, philosophy suggested that meaning is possible only 
against the background of consciousness; that is, the higher order cognitive processes and 
faculties that make us unique among living creatures are due to consciousness. If we consider 
recent findings, we can see that consciousness is mostly comprehended as a capacity that 
provides a better chance for survival and makes higher order cognitive functions possible.  
In what follows, I will attempt to focus on two radically different approaches to conscious-
ness. Specifically, I will outline theories that seek a neural correlate of consciousness and 
are aimed at creating a causal model of neuronal activity and conscious experience, and I 
will also delineate approaches which suggest consciousness can be understood only in a 
wider setting, including the body and its environment. 
 
Focusing on Intracranial Processes 
Most of the time when consciousness is in focus, we are reminded of the old metaphysical 
question of how to relate physical and mental phenomena. The question has been refor-
mulated in various ways, but even now many consider it a source of considerable diffi-
culty. “Although neuroscience has identified many empirical correspondences between 
brain activity and mental life, the conceptual chasm between brain and mind seems as 
broad as it ever was” (Dehaene, 2014, p. 190). However, Bernard J. Baars, the originator 
of a very influential theory, proposed that we avoid asking it entirely. 
In his book titled A Cognitive Theory of Consciousness (1988), Baars laid the foundation 
of global workspace theory (GWT). Baars suggests we disregard the old metaphysical 
question in favour of considering consciousness as a theoretical construct, in the same way 
as atoms were regarded a long time ago, as gravity was later, and not that far in the past 
genes, which were described based on inference rather than observation. (Baars, 2003, 
p. 2ff.). An additional requirement of this perspective is to find observable and measurable 
states as they relate to consciousness, and contrast them with unconscious ones. We need 
to operationally define that which can be considered as being conscious. We must also be 
able to distinguish conscious states from other related theoretical constructs such as at ⁠ten-
⁠tion, memory, executive processes, etc. We can find four conditions of conscious pro-
cesses which fit well into standard research practice: they “1. can be reported and acted 
upon, 2. with verifiable accuracy, 3. under optimal reporting conditions, 4. and which are 
reported as conscious” (Baars, 2003, p. 4). Following the contrastive method and taking 
into consideration the abovementioned operational criteria, global workspace theory can 
be described in an unambiguous way. It “is a cognitive architecture with an explicit role 
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for consciousness in humans. It suggests that conscious contents involve a fleeting inte-
grative memory capacity in the brain, in which only one consistent content can be domi-
nant at any given moment” (Baars & Gage, 2010, p. 287). 
Stanislas Dehaene’s global neuronal workspace theory, while accepting the core idea of 
GWT, i.e., that consciousness is a global broadcasting of information within the cortex, 
suggests consciousness “arises from a neuronal network whose raison d’être is the massive 
sharing of pertinent information throughout the brain. …We believe that a special set of 
neurons diffuses conscious messages throughout the brain: giant cells whose long axons 
crisscross the cortex, interconnecting it into an integrated whole” (Dehaene, 2014, p. 24f.). 
In accordance with the original theory, he also devotes considerable attention to uncon-
scious processes which can be considered as being on the one hand automatic and reflexive 
functions, and which, importantly, can yield an informational background as a possible 
source of intuition on the other hand. The unconscious plays an important role in various 
capabilities, such as word comprehension, numerical addition, error detection, and problem 
solving—just to name a few. It operates quickly and in parallel across an extensive range 
of stimuli and responses (Dehaene, 2014, p. 106). Prior studies had recognized that damage 
in certain brain areas can cause strange constellations of normal function and dysfunction, 
such as blind sight, visual form agnosia, and spatial neglect3—to mention a few well dis-
cussed cases where unconscious perception undoubtedly plays an important role in the pa-
tient’s behaviour. Experiments that tested binocular rivalry and attentional blink provided 
evidence that shows there is a persistent fight for conscious access (Dehaene, 2014, p. 42).4  
Experiments with masking revealed that unconscious processing can facilitate or bias con-
scious responses. It turned out there is a well-defined threshold whereby visual stimuli are 
consciously perceivable or not: when an image is presented for 40 milliseconds it is utterly 
invisible, but it is readily noticeable when the duration is increased to 60 milliseconds 
(Dehaene, 2014, p. 54). 
An experiment that tested intuitions regarding probability and numerical analysis con-
ducted in 1997 (and reinforced in 2011) nicely showed the effect unconscious processing 
                                                          
3 In the case of blind sight lesion in the primary visual cortex, conscious vision is rendered impossible (patients 
report they do not see, let’s say a flash of light, but can accurately point to the place of the flash); patients 
suffering from visual form agnosia are not able to recognize form, but their motor system behaves as if the patient 
could recognize it; we speak about spatial neglect if, e.g., the lesion is near the right inferior parietal lobe and the 
patient ignores the space on her left side and is impaired in her conscious judgements, though not really blind. 
4 “Binocular rivalry reveals a competition between two simultaneous images. During the attentional blink, a 
similar competition occurs across time, between two images that are successively presented at the same location” 
(Dehaene, 2014, p. 45). 
We need to note here that Dehaene considers conscious access as a key condition for consciousness. “What 
counts as genuine consciousness, I will argue, is conscious access—the simple fact that usually, whenever we 
are awake, whatever we decide to focus on may become conscious. Neither vigilance nor attention alone is 
sufficient.”(Dehaene, 2014, p. 18) As we will see, his suggestion is consonant with others’ considerations. 
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may have in decision making.5 The experiment seems to provide evidence that we may 
have advantage of an unconscious incubation period. Since conscious processing entails a 
huge load on working memory and only one thing at a time can be consciously processed, 
it takes considerable time to calculate from random choices which alternatives yield a better 
gain with more security. At the same time, “[u]nconscious processes excel in assigning 
values to many items and averaging them to reach a decision” (Dehaene, 2014, p. 101). 
The importance of unconscious processing and even unconscious perception is beyond 
question. Chris Frith assigns to the unconscious a curious, but significant role, viz., our 
brain provides us with illusions. These illusions suggest, among other things, that there is 
a separated physical and mental world, that we have direct access to the objects of the 
external world, and that we bear an isolated and private mental world.  
As we can see in masking experiments and the above-described case of unconscious pre-
diction, we can easily accept Frith’s suggestion that “our brain doesn’t tell us everything 
it knows.” But he goes further and proposes our brain sometimes “actively misleads us” 
(Frith, 2007, p. 47). Visual illusions (Frith refers to Hering lines, the Pantheon illusion, 
and the Ames room) and the bottleneck of conscious processing underpin this suggestion. 
Taking into account the Ames room, we see three men who are extremely different in size 
(as opposed to the other possibility, which is in fact the foundation of the illusion, a mod-
ified, not normally shaped room). How does our brain interpret and decide which inter-
pretation to choose on the basis of “the very limited and imperfect signals provided by our 
senses” (Frith, 2007, p. 85)? 
Correctly predicting what comes next is crucial for survival. Predictive skills are learned 
capabilities and, according to Frith, our brain learns in accordance with the rules of associa-
tive learning. As Pavlov’s dog, Thorndike’s cats, and Skinner’s superstitious pigeons show, 
a pattern of behaviour that can be described in terms of prediction develops on the basis of 
trial and error plus reward and punishment. If after a given signal or action the reward 
emerges in a short time, subjects assign high value to it; otherwise the signal or action will 
not be considered as being worthy of interest. The correctness of predictions is affirmed or 
disaffirmed by unconscious chemical processes in the brain. Nerve cells release neurotrans-
mitters, and these neurotransmitters are important indicators of fitness. Accordingly, the 
nerve cells’ activity, i.e., whether they send a positive signal (unexpected reward), a negative 
one (expected reward does not arrive) or no signal at all (the prediction was correct), helps 
the brain to learn in a manner similar to what associative learning describes. 
                                                          
5 In the experiment, subjects were given four decks of cards and a symbolic loan of $2000 to manage. On each card 
there was a message stating that they had earned or lost $100. Two of the decks were composed to earn a lot at the 
beginning but lose heavily later on, whilst the other two provided a balanced, but not too high, gain. The time period 
when subjects randomly choose among the decks without any preconception or calculation was the focus of the 
experiment. “Fascinatingly, just before they choose a card from a bad deck, their hands begin to sweat, thus gener-
ating a drop in skin conductance. This physiological marker of the sympathetic nervous system indicates that their 




This learning process entails probability. As the McGurk effect6 shows, our brain com-
bines different sense modalities, and when it receives contradicting information, it tries to 
fuse them together and give one unambiguous percept. That is, we move in a world which 
is reconstructed by our brain in accordance with certain predictive capabilities and perma-
nent checking. We have no access to most of this reconstruction process because these 
processes are not conscious. Other people’s behaviour and intentions are reconstructed in 
the same fashion. Similarly, we do not control our body in the manner we believe we do. 
We are only aware of our goals and preferences but not the motor commands, the efferent 
and afferent copies which provide smooth execution. 
Frith suggests “‘I do . . .’ indicates those situations where I am aware of what my brain is 
doing. But the ‘I’ in this case is still my brain.” (Frith, 2007, p. 106) And moreover, the 
border of my body blurs, just as the imagined and believed self is modified in order to 
understand others. “Your prejudices and your observations of their [others’] behavior auto-
matically make you become, for a moment, more like the person you are interacting with. 
This makes it easier for you to predict what they will do or say next” (Frith, 2007, p. 170). 
As we can see, neural-based reconstructions of conscious and unconscious processes sug-
gest conscious states are produced strictly in the brain. We can see correlations between 
mental states and neural activity, and we can describe brain’s activity as a learning process 
based on earlier experiences and certain chemical processes in the brain. But we need to 
ask: How can the brain as predictive machinery learn without external stimuli? Descrip-
tions of different experiments and the acquired results seem to suggest that the investiga-
tion is designed to be able to prove that neural mechanisms are the cause of conscious 
states. That is, we presuppose that intracranial processes are responsible both for conscious 
and unconscious processes. 
Beyond these suggestions, there are arguments which seemingly support the proposal that 
consciousness is the result of pure brain activity. The extensive literature on phantom limb 
pain seems to provide evidence that the brain in itself is capable of creating an illusion of 
pain, or non-existent stimuli on non-existent limbs. Voluntary actions also seem to be a good 
candidate for evidence that brain is an autonomous driver of behaviour. According to Libet’s 
experiment, “brain activity indicating that the volunteer was about to lift a finger occurred 
about 300 msec before that volunteer reported having the urge to lift his or her finger” (Frith, 
2007, p. 66). That is, our brain starts to arrange the planned movement before our conscious 
report.7 Hence, our brain plays a decisive role in voluntary actions, and moreover, our brain 
makes an unconscious choice before we become aware of it (Frith, 2007, p. 68). 
                                                          
6 McGurk’s experiment demonstrates how our brain combines visual and auditory perceptions. The movement 
of the lips suggest ga ga ga, the mere sounds suggest ba ba ba, and when we see and hear simultaneously, we 
hear da da da. 
7 Here I would like to call your attention to Ramachandran’s remark according to which, “Perhaps our very notion 
of causation requires a radical revision …as happened in quantum mechanics” (Ramachandran, 2004, p. 89).  
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Our brain is capable of deluding us, according to Frith, by suggesting truth underlying the 
illusions of the distinctness of mental and physical, direct access to the things of the world, 
and a separate private physical and mental life that is under control. That is, our brain is 
capable of framing our mental setting due to its unconscious processes. Since neural ac-
tivity shows a pattern of connectedness in our brain, investigating neural networks and 
connectivity may provide a code which illuminates how our brain transforms our thoughts. 
Although “[w]e still do not understand exactly how millions of neuronal discharges, dis-
tributed across time and space, encode a conscious representation,” we do not give up 
trying to find “new mathematical instruments in order to understand these complicated 
patterns” (Dehaene, 2014, p. 164f.). 
Beyond illusions, including phantom sensations and our belief in voluntary actions, there 
is an additional aspect underlying the brain’s exhaustive role in consciousness, namely the 
brain’s autonomous functioning. “Autonomy is the primary property of the nervous sys-
tem. Intrinsic neuronal activity dominates over external excitation. As a result, our brain 
is never passively submitted to its environment but generates its own stochastic patterns 
of activity” (Dehaene, 2014, p. 222). However, a question may be asked: If we consider 
continuous background electrical oscillations as being a facilitator of the synchronization 
of the cells, how can we consider the maintenance of it as autonomy against the back-
ground of an evolving brain structure which adapts to more and more complicated tasks?  
Similarly, we may have doubts whether patients who have never had a certain limb could 
have the experience of that phantom limb or phantom pain in it. Likewise, if we take into 
consideration that conscious processing is time-consuming as compared with non-con-
scious processing, why is it surprising that the conscious report is delayed compared to 
the onset of cerebral action? 
Regarding the autonomy of the brain when consciousness is in question, we have a huge 
amount of data on how ongoing oscillation supports smooth processing, as well as how 
consciousness ceaselessly stabilizes perception, creates lasting thoughts, and sometimes 
illusions and phantom pains. We have different models of how consciousness is beneficial 
for biological success (Humphrey, 2000; Grazianom 2014) and how it creates a virtual 
world (Frith, 2014). But although in each case it is not explicitly proposed that the brain 
is separate from its environment, it is suggested that neural activity is the key to conscious-
ness. Notwithstanding, I find it peculiar to argue for the brain’s autonomy whilst consid-
ering adaptation and learning as decisive in both the brain’s phylogeny and ontogeny.  
 
Consciousness Enframed 
Hereinafter, I will give a rather rough outline of slightly different approaches that are re-
lated to embodiment and enactment and which view consciousness from a different angle, 
giving it a more extended basis than the previously delineated ones.  
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The notion of embodiment has been explicated by Maurice Merleau-Ponty in his 1945 
book, Phénoménologie de la perception. He suggests “far from my body’s being for me 
no more than a fragment of space, there would be no space at all for me if I had no body” 
(Merleau-Ponty, 2005, p. 89); and a couple of pages later: “if the words ‘enclose’ and 
‘between’ have a meaning for us, it is because they derive it from our experience as em-
bodied subjects. In space itself independently of the presence of a psychophysical subject, 
there is no direction, no inside and no outside” (p. 182). 
This idea is revived in many fields, including art history thanks to Rudolf Arnheim, cog-
nitive metaphor theory as a result of work by Mark Johnson and George Lakoff, and more 
importantly from our perspective, “in new sciences of the mind” (Varela et al., 1993, 
p. xv). Merleau-Ponty’s holistic view suggests transforming the dualism of the soul and 
body into the distinction of “the lived and the known.” It is possible because a human 
being, the so-called subject, “lives in a universe of experience, in a milieu which is neutral 
with regard to the substantial distinctions between the organism, thought and extension; 
he lives in a direct commerce with beings, things and his own body” (Merleau-Ponty, 
1963, p. 189). In his view, consciousness provides the ground for a meaningful unity 
where the ambient world, the acting subject and its body, thus the mental and the physical, 
are inseparable. In accordance with Merleau-Ponty’s views, the term embodiment sug-
gests “that cognition depends upon the kinds of experience that come from having a body 
with sensorimotor capacities, and …that these individual sensorimotor capacities are 
themselves embedded in a more encompassing biological, psychological, and cultural con-
text”(Varela et al., 1993, p. 172f.). Theories built upon the idea of embodiment vary de-
pending on how they relate to computationalism, mental representation, and to what extent 
they consider its validity. For now I will not go into details regarding the differentiation 
of the notion of embodiment; rather, I will focus on different conceptions which suggest 
consciousness and cognitive processes are inseparable from having a body, bearing bodily 
skills and interactively being immersed into our environment.  
We can find many fruitful attempts in the last centuries of the history of philosophy that 
call attentions to the importance of the body (James), movement (Bergson), our embed-
dedness (Heidegger), and environment as it plays a role in our consciousness (Merleau-
Ponty). All these suggestions relate in some way to the metaphysical question of dualism: 
these theories attempted to eliminate or a least reformulate the body-mind divide, but take 
significantly different routes from what Baars suggested. We already touched the question 
of dualism when referring to Baars’ suggestion that we need to abandon the metaphysical 
burden of body-mind dualism and in hinting at his criticism of James’ doubts (Baars, 1988, 
p. 14). I believe that James’ scruples about consciousness’ ontological status were not 
baseless. First, in his 1904 paper he calls into question only that consciousness “stands for 
an entity” but still believes that “it does stand for a function” (James, 1987, p. 1141f.; 
emphasis added). GWT is also looking for function: the distinctive criteria of conscious-
ness are functional ones and, more precisely, the neural patterns entail a certain capability, 
function, but not an entity.  
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At the same time, GWT is tangled up unnoticed with the metaphysical question of body-
mind dualism when it tries to demonstrate a causal, sometimes constitutional, relation be-
tween brain processes and mental states. When searching for the neural correlate of con-
sciousness or trying to illuminate the causal relation between subjective reports of 
phenomenal experience and brain activity, I believe it is illuminating to recall James’ ca-
veat that “any single non-perceptual experience tends to get counted twice over, just as a 
perceptual experience does, figuring in one context as an object or field of objects, in 
another as a state of mind: and all this without the least internal self-diremption on its own 
part into consciousness and content” (James, 1987, p. 1148). 
Against the background of James’ neutral monism, this duplication of the same phenome-
non is avoidable. He considers pure experience as the only “primal stuff or material in the 
world, a stuff of which everything is composed.” If we take pure experience as our depar-
ture (as opposed to the dualism of physical and mental), the relation between the subject 
and object “is a part of pure experience; one of its “terms” becomes the subject or bearer of 
the knowledge, the knower, the other becomes the object known” (James, 1987, p. 1142). 
This monism may remind us of recent efforts in certain enactive and sensorimotor ap-
proaches. The enactive approach emphasizes “that cognition is not the representation of a 
pregiven world by a pregiven mind but is rather the enactment of a world and a mind on 
the basis of a history of a variety of actions that a being in the world performs” (Varela 
et al., 1993, p. 9). 
According to Evan Thompson, the enactive approach tries to unify the idea of autonomous 
agents as they generate and maintain themselves and thus their cognitive domain: the nerv-
ous system is considered as a dynamic system which creates meaning; cognition as being 
“the exercise of skilful know-how in situated embodied action”; the world is conceived as 
being a relational domain enacted; and experience is conceived as crucial in the under-
standing of the mind and has to be investigated phenomenologically (Thompson, 2007, 
p. 13). Against the background of the above-sketched scenario, the “transformation of the 
world into an environment happens through the organism’s sense-making activity.” Ac-
cordingly, cognition does not happen internally but rather it “is a relational process of 
sense-making that takes place between the system and its environment” (Thompson & 
Stapleton, 2009, p. 25f.). Since cognition is defined as a relational process, the cognizing 
agent and its environment are not separable. Additionally, the coupling between them is 
without any gap, because this cognizing agent is a physical system which therefore has 
direct access to its physical environment.  
Radical branches of the enactive or sensorimotor approach make similar efforts to illumi-
nate their radicalism, which is made of a kind of monism and dynamism. There is an im-
portant difference between the abovementioned enactive approaches and the subsequently 
outlined ones: the latter attempt to avoid the use of terms which entail reasoning, a de-
manding higher order cognitive function. On this basis, the so-called hard problem of con-
sciousness is not solvable, but meaningless, and representationalism is radically mitigated. 
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Radical embodied cognitive science (Chemero, 2009), or more recently extended cogni-
tive-phenomenological system theory (ECPSt; Silberstein & Chemero, 2011, 2015) take 
the point of James’ neutral monism, dynamic system theory, and J. J. Gibbson’s account 
of affordance. ECPSt considers cognitive systems as being “extended brain-body-environ-
ment systems.” But they can be regarded as being extended only “when environmental 
features form constitutive parts of the cognitive phenomenon” (Silberstein & Chemero, 
2015, p. 189). Since experience is processed cognitively and cognition is experiential, the 
“phenomenological world of experience is neither in the ‘head’ nor in the ‘external world’ 
– it is fundamentally relational” (p. 190). According to ECPSt—unlike Frith and 
Dehaene—“the brain is not some sort of virtual reality machine that generates a matrix-
world internal to the brain. The very idea of a neural correlate of consciousness as a suffi-
cient condition for some conscious state is a misnomer” (p. 190). 
With similar targets in mind but a slightly different focus, Hutto and Kirchhoff recapitulate 
the attempt, abandoning content-involving basic cognition. As they wrote: 
In Radicalizing Enactivism, Daniel Hutto and Erik Myin (2013) champion a vision of enac-
tivism according to which the plethora of cognitive activity of humans and non-human organ-
isms is best explained in terms of and understood as dynamically unfolding, situated embodied 
interactions and engagement with environmental affordances. Radical embodied-enactive ap-
proaches to cognition (REC, for short) thus reject the familiar assumption that the best expla-
nation of cognition always requires positing contents that are acquired and transformed in 
order to create representations that then inform and guide what an organism does or experi-
ences. (2016, p. 348) 
That is, REC takes its departure, like ECPSt, by considering the cognizing agent, its bodily 
conditions and environment, as a dynamically intertwined system which does not need 
mental representations while it is engaged in and with its environment. This idea had al-
ready re-emerged in 2004: “why an internal representation would be any better than access 
to the world itself. This harkens back to Wittgenstein’s idea that anything a picture in the 
head could do could be done by a picture held in the hand. We go a step further: Why do 
we need a picture at all? The world is right there, after all. We are in the world” (Noë, 
2004, p. 218f.). 
Both the REC and ECPSt approaches attempt to abandon mental representation based on 
the above quoted Wittgensteinian considerations on the one hand and the Jamesian caveat 
on the other. Both REC and ECPSt suggest that the hard problem is unsolvable, and that 
therefore there is no need to disprove it, but both provide a framework within which it has 
no sense. That is, phenomenality “should be understood as the character of engaging with 
the world in different ways” (Hutto & Kirchhoff, 2016, p. 353). 
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The so-called sensorimotor approach, agreeing with the importance of active engagement 
when having a feel, or having a conscious experience8 bearing a certain quality, goes a bit 
further when it suggests that “what constitutes the fact of having a feel is that changes like 
those I have just listed9 will occur when we do certain thing. … [T]his state of affairs 
constitutes the feel” (O’Regan, 2011, p. 158). 
As we can see on the basis of earlier philosophical considerations, the enactive and sen-
sorimotor approaches suggest that cognitive processes and, specifically, consciousness 
and its phenomenal character are hardly comprehensible as being exclusively intracranial. 
It is quite obvious that the theories referred to in the earlier section of this paper are more 
or less committed to a different framework than the latter ones. The former are based on a 
vocabulary that reaches back to cognitive psychology, which is attached to representation-
alism, and importantly, to searching for neural mechanisms when consciousness and dif-
ferent cognitive skills are in question. The latter theories are committed to abandoning 
representationalism and taking the perspective of a rather holistic and dynamic approach 
to cognitive processes. In what follows, I will attempt to show that despite the difference 
between the frameworks and presuppositions, the seemingly unbridgeable gulf between 
the descriptions can at least be attenuated. 
 
Representation Revisited 
Authors, even those who think the brain is the right place to look if we are seeking an 
explanation of the modal character of a perceptual experience, express suspicion regarding 
the tight commitment to representations: “it is unclear just how completely cognitive states 
must be representational. ...Must every component of every cognitive state be a represen-
tation? This seems to be an overly strong empirical hypothesis not warranted by any data 
we know of.” (Adams & Aizawa, 2010a, p. 55) 
Regarding the scope and limits of representations, Adams & Aizawa formulate an addi-
tional concern: 
We would not want to claim that these neurons [in different visual areas which participate in 
creating the visual field of an organism] are representations simply in virtue of their causal 
connections to environmental stimuli, but we do think they are likely to turn out to be repre-
sentations. These considerations seem to us to provide defeasible reasons to accept what cog-
nitive psychologists typically presuppose, namely that cognitive processes involve 
representations. (2010a, p. 33) 
                                                          
8 For a short outline of O’Regan’s conception of conscious access and phenomenal consciousness see Kondor 
(2015, p. 153f.). For further details see O’Regan (2011). 
9 A non-exhaustive list of the kinds of laws which apply when a part of one’s body is touched: “Active motion of 
the body part” modifies the stimuli; “active motion by a different body part” in special cases can alter the stimuli; 
“passive motion” induced by external force changes the stimuli; at the same time we perceive change in our visual 
field; and in some cases we can hear temporally correlated sound of scratching (O’Reagan, 2011, p. 157). 
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This suspicion illuminates the ambiguous character of representation as it is used in psy-
chology, and also in neurosciences as we will see. According to traditional cognitive sci-
ence, representations play a role in perception, remembering, reasoning, and dreaming—
to mention only a few important mental activities. Cognitive science maintains that repre-
sentational states are content-bearing and carry information in a certain way. We perform 
operations over them and these operations result in problem-solving and planning. Repre-
sentations presuppose certain relations, such as mapping, (i.e., environmental structures 
are coded onto internal structures in accordance with certain rules); intentionality, since 
representations are about something; asymmetry between the representation and the rep-
resented; and standing-in relation (i.e., that which a representation stands for is the repre-
sentation’s content; Nagel, 2005, p.5). 
Richard A. Watson suggests that representations are considered from the very beginning as 
they are based on isomorphism. Isomorphism is meant to be “any degree or kind of resem-
blance, likeness, or similarity of pattern, structure, or relational organization between entities 
or events as defined in the broadest sense” (1995, p. xi). Even authors like Descartes, who 
denied the necessity of resemblance (in the above-described sense) between the represented 
entity and its idea, fall back to the route of isomorphism. Watson’s argument shows that 
Descartes’ ambiguity is rooted in his ontological commitment to the dualism of the extended 
and cognising substances, and his clarifying efforts often fail because the linguistic toolkit 
imposes an extra burden when trying to close the gap between two substances.  
Beyond ambiguities, Watson quotes Descartes calling attention to an important distinction 
within a dualist framework: 
The subject I propose to deal with in this treatise is light, and the first point I want to draw to 
your attention is that there may be a difference between the [i] sensation we have of light (i.e., 
the idea of light which is formed in our imagination by the mediation of our eyes) and [ii] 
what it is that produces this sensation within us (i.e., what it is in a flame or the sun that we 
call by the name “light”). (1995, p. 30) 
Descartes seemed to be very distinctive when he calls our attention to two different phe-
nomena when we attempt to understand the same process. That is, (i) the sensation of light 
which is mediated by our eyes and processed further in a way10 and (ii) what is the cause 
of our sensation. This distinction gains special emphasis against the background of James’ 
previously mentioned caveat, and, at the same time, is very important in light of the ques-
tion of whether we can limit the investigation of conscious experience to brain mecha-
nisms or should extend it to the interaction between the organism and its environment. 
Nowadays, thanks to brain imaging techniques, neural activity is considered as a repre-
sentation of a certain mental state. In this case, a mental state is represented via neural 
activity, i.e., the neural state is considered a physical equivalent of a mental phenomenon. 
On the basis of representation as based on isomorphism, Dehaene’s proposal that we can 
                                                          
10 It is beyond the framework of the present paper to discuss how ambiguous Descartes’ notions of imagination 
and conception are regarding representation. For details, see Watson (1995, pp. 19-37). 
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detect patterns of active and inactive cells as they are forming “an internal code for the 
contents of subjective perception” (2014, p. 176) is promising. But, as Dehaene himself 
notes, “[p]roving that a pattern of brain activity causes a mental state is one of the hardest 
problems facing neuroscientists” (p. 179). This is not mere bad luck, but rather it is rooted 
in the relation labelled as representation. When it is out of concern that a living organism 
is not reducible to its neural activity but is rather in a symbiotic relation with its environ-
ment, the fallacy of obliterating the difference between representation and causation can 
enter the scene. On the basis of correlation, we can suppose that neural activity, as we have 
access to it, represents a certain mental state, but it is hard to imagine that neural activity 
alone creates this state. Of course, there is no experiment which denies the existence of 
the stimuli, but since the scope of investigation is limited to brain processes, interaction 
with the body and the environment is inconspicuous and can easily fade into oblivion. 
Nevertheless, the representation of neural activity via brain imaging techniques is visible, 
and is only a part of the process. The other part is the external stimuli: the flame or the sun. 
If we take exclusively intracranial processes into consideration, it will be challenging in-
deed to provide causal relations. Cause and representation requires different time orders: 
the cause is prior to its effect; a representation is a representation of something that exists 
in a certain way before its representation.11 Accordingly, if we consider neural activity as 
being a cause of a certain mental state (e.g., consciousness), it cannot be considered as being 
its representation. The visible reconstruction (publicly available representation) of a neural 
state (thanks to brain imaging and statistical methods), I believe, does not provide satisfac-
tory grounds for thinking that this neuronal constellation generates the given mental states.  
It is beyond question that if we are talking about mental representation, we need to under-
stand it as a theoretical object. But often, representation is not appropriately specified. 
Public representations which are accessible to others are not theoretical constructs, but 
artefacts. From this perspective, it is quite clear that the representation of a neural state 
(which is considered as being in correlation with a mental state) can cause anything in the 
subject’s behaviour. 
A representation is a theoretical object that bears an abstract resemblance to something out-
side itself. In somewhat different terms, there is an abstract match or isomorphism between 
the representation and the thing that is represented. …We can think of knowledge, percepts, 
images, plans, intentions, and memories as representations. …What is the adequate evidence 
for the existence of a mental representation?12 In psychology we often infer that human beings 
have mentally represented an object if they can correctly detect matches and mismatches to 
the object at a later time. (Baars, 2011, p. 41)  
                                                          
11 Haptic images, which are similarly interactive as virtual ones but they “were to be manipulated as part of the 
modification or construction of a physical object, as in nanomanipulation” (Daston & Galison, 2007, p. 385), 
may confuse this time order. But cognition as a brain-based activity does not necessitate going into detail regard-
ing how the manipulation of representations entails. 
12 Cf. Adams’ & Aizawa’s doubts (2010a, p. 55). 
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The above description is clearly about mental representation. The following one refers to 
public representations, but the point of departure is not that unambiguous: “Ideas appear 
to be represented in the cortex in terms of complex webs of learned connectivities, rather 
than localized filing systems with neatly arranged conceptual categories” (Baars & Gage, 
2013, p. 360; emphasis added). As with Dehaene’s description of a conscious percept, we 
have a pattern of neural activation of an idea, whatever it is. 
“When I look at a tree in the garden, I don’t have the tree in my mind. What I have in mind 
is a model (or representation) of the tree constructed by my brain. This model is built up 
through a series of guesses and predictions”13 (Frith, 2007, p. 170). The model of a tree as 
a mental representation is the result of the model-making brain’s learning process, i.e., it 
is supposed to be generated by the brain. “The fortress of the conscious mind possesses a 
small drawbridge that forces mental representations to compete with one another” 
(Dehaene, 2014, p. 46). This lively description of the bottleneck of consciousness suggests 
we have unconscious mental representations competing to become a conscious one. But it 
does not help us find out what we should think about these unconscious mental represen-
tations. Unconscious mental representations are not accessible subjectively; accordingly, 
when we are to detect them we can have only indirect reports about them. Perhaps it is 
even more puzzling when Dehaene describes the working of certain specialized neurons: 
single neurons which can be activated by a definite picture, sound, etc., but only in the 
case of conscious perception (p. 172f.). Conscious perception is, at the same time, a spe-
cial neural network activation within which the communication between different brain 
areas, even in a hierarchical sense, is highly active and bi-directional. If we suppose a 
causal relation between neuronal state and conscious perception, where can we find the 
mental representation of the percept: in the communication of the network, or in the single 
neuron which is sensitive to a given phenomenon? 
The above outlined picture can be summarized as follows: The term representation is used 
at least in two distinct senses: (i) in the sense of neural pattern, i.e., as a mental event de-
scribed in terms of neuronal activity; and (ii) in the sense of the content of consciousness 
(Frith, 1999), or as a theoretical construct that stands for a mental phenomenon (Baars, 
2011).14 In the first case, representation is publicly available, i.e., we have access to neural 
states via brain imaging technologies. In the second case, the content of consciousness 
and/or the mental phenomenon is merely presupposed, as it occurs in the brain and we 
hardly have any access to them at the moment. Unfortunately, we cannot yet crack the code 
of how the brain creates a mental state (Dehaene, 2014) and we do not know any physio-
logical marker which can indicate that a mental representation has been formed (Frith, 
1999). Importantly, we have no evidence that cognitive processes involve mental represen-
tation, it is merely presupposed. Additionally, we do not know to what extent a cognitive 
                                                          
13 The idea of brain as a “model-making machine” is rather accepted. See also Ramachandran (2004, p. 105). 
14 The content of conscious experience and different mental phenomena can be considered interchangeably since 
Baars’ listed examples are possible only in case of conscious processing.  
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state should be representational as regards its components. We have direct access only to 
the scenery, behaviour, report, and recorded neural states. In accordance with this infor-
mation, mental representation was introduced as a shortening of what could be the content 
of the conscious experience and/or cognitive state of which we can find the neural correlate. 
But if we keep in mind what James suggested, it easily turns out that mental representation 
is only a presupposed duplicate of the perceived scenery that we should have found in 
neural activity. Introducing mental representation when we search for the connection be-
tween the object of one’s conscious experience and the physiological changes in our nerv-
ous system entails more difficulties than answers. The introduced theoretical construct 
creates difficult to solve questions: what kind of physiological marker should we seek to 
be able to detect when a mental representation is under construction? How can our brain 
capacity adapt to permanent change regarding its representational burden? What is the 
difference between the neural pattern of a cognitive state and its content?  
Mental representation as models, or webs of learned connectivities which are capable of 
competition, mirrors the presupposition of the enterprise, viz., to prove that our brain gen-
erates consciousness, hence the phenomenal character of experience. This means we have 
to accommodate the whole body and its experiences in the brain in a way that allows us to 
gain answers to the questions phenomenal experience raises. If we work within an embod-
ied and enacted framework and accept that the sensorimotor approach suggests that expe-
rience is not generated somewhere, rather that it is a capacity to interact with the world, 
then we will not need to find the content of consciousness in the brain.  
 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, I would like to draw attention to the curious situation where although theo-
retical constructs may aid inquiry and metaphoric language may help expression and the 
explication of a new phenomenon, they are also likely to engender confusion. If, on the one 
hand, representation is used without strict distinctiveness between mental and public and 
we are forgetful about mental phenomena as a theoretical construct, we may be tangled up 
with unsolvable paradoxes and concealed gaps. On the other hand, taking radical views on 
enactment and embodiment into consideration, specifically their effort to abandon repre-
sentationalism and consequently its vocabulary, we can remove the obstacles from the route 
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